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ANTITRUST-SUPREME COURT EXTENDS NOERR
IMMUNITY FROM SHERMAN ACT TO
ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE
ADJUDICATION
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 92 S. Ct.
609 (1972).
In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited1 the
Supreme Court held 2 that a conspiracy in restraint of trade which
was carried out by a concerted program of litigation could be a
violation of the Sherman Act.3  The suit was brought under the
Clayton Act 4 by Trucking Unlimited, an organization representing
several trucking companies, against the petitioners, who were an-
other group of truckers operating in California. Common carriers
in California operate under licenses granted by the California Pub-
lic Utilities Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The complaint alleged that the defendants conspired to eliminate
competing truckers by concertedly opposing license applications at
agency licensing hearings. In order to carry out this scheme,
the defendants pooled their resources to establish a fund to fi-
nance the litigation. They publicized their intent to oppose every
application by competitors regardless of the merits of any case
and to appeal adverse agency determinations to the courts. The
1. 92 S. Ct. 609 (1972), aff'g, 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970).
2. The appeal to the circuit court and then to the Supreme Court
was taken from a dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action. 1967 Trade Cas. P. 72,298 (N.D. Cal.). Therefore, the allegations
of the complaint were taken as true. Trucking Unlimited v. California
Motor Transport Co., 432 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1970).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to mo-
nopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor. ...
4. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue there-
fore in any district court of the United States in the district in
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
object was to make the process of obtaining a license prohibitively
expensive and time-consuming, and thereby to deter applications. 5
The defendants contended that the rule of Eastern Railroad Presi-
dents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc.,6 which held that
attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws were
exempt from the antitrust laws, applied to attempts to influence
adjudication in the courts and administrative agencies. The Court
agreed, and could see no reason to distinguish attempts to influence
adjudication in courts and administrative agencies from attempts
to influence the legislative or executive branches of government.
However, the Court went on to hold that in this case the conduct
of the defendants came within the "sham" exception7 of the Noerr
decision, since there was no genuine intent to influence the govern-
ment. The defendants' primary goal was to harm the petitioners
directly, not to influence the government.
I. THE NOERR DocTmN
Trucking Unlimited is the latest of a line of cases interpreting
a doctrine which had its origin in Eastern Railroad Presidents Con-
ference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,8 decided by the Supreme
Court in 1961. Noerr involved a complaint brought under the
Clayton Act9 by truckers in Pennsylvania alleging antitrust viola-
tions by the defendant, an association of twenty-four railroads op-
erating in that state. The railroads had financed a publicity cam-
paign in order to influence the passage of laws restricting per-
missible truckloads and increasing the tax assessment on truckers.
It was alleged that the sole purpose of the campaign was to destroy
the plaintiffs as competitors to the railroads. The Court held for
the defendants, because "no violation of the Act can be predicated
on mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of
laws."'10  The Court gave two main reasons for this immunity."
The first reason was that to subject such activity to antitrust sanc-
tions would impair the functioning of representative government.
The legislative and executive branches cannot act on behalf of the
people, if the people are not free to inform them of their wishes.
5. The scheme was successful in deterring applications. Before the
defendants began massive intervention in 1961 many applications were
made every year and most of them were granted. But after 1961 the num-
ber of applications dropped drastically. 57 CAL. L. REv. 518, 528 (1969).
The technique has been used before. See Oberst, Parties to Administra-
tive Proceedings, 40 MICH. L. REV. 378, 389 n.45 (1942).
6. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
7. See text accompanying footnote 36, infra.
8. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
10. 365 U.S. at 135.
11. In addition to the two reasons given, the court said that it was
reluctant to consider solicitation of government action as a violation of the
antitrust laws simply because such conduct was so dissimilar to the sort of
combinations typically constituting violations (price-fixing agreements, boy-
cotts, and market-division arrangements, for example). 365 U.S. at 136.
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To hold that the government retains the power to act
in this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same
time, that the people cannot freely inform the govern-
ment of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a
purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political
activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever
in the legislative history of that Act.
12
The second reason which the Court gave for exempting solicitation
of the passage or enforcement of laws from the Sherman Act was
that such conduct is protected by the first amendment right of pe-
tition, and that to construe the Sherman Act as applying to these
activities would raise constitutional questions. 1
The plaintiff in Noerr, however, contended that even if at-
tempts to influence government were ordinarily exempt from the
Sherman Act, the defendants had forfeited the exemption because
their sole purpose in attempting to influence the passage and en-
forcement of laws was to destroy competition. This contention
follows from a line of antitrust cases which established that an
illegal (i.e. anticompetitive) purpose renders conduct which is of
itself innocent violative of the Sherman Act.' 4 This "illegal pur-
12. Id. at 137.
13. Id. at 138. The purpose of the right to petition is to promote gov-
ernment responsiveness to the electorate and government access to in-
formation supplied by those seeking to influence lawmakers. 81 HARv. L.
REV. 847, 849 (1968). Thus, eliminating redundancy, the two grounds
for exempting attempts to influence government from the antitrust laws
are: (1) The Sherman Act was not intended to regulate political ac-
tivity. (2) Attempts to influence government are protected by the right
to petition.
It seems inappropriate to invoke the right to petition to protect a right
to intervene in adjudication. The right to petition has traditionally per-
tained to the legislative and executive branches and not to adjudication.
In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 216 N.W. 127, 55 A.L.R. 1355 (1927); Brown,
The Right to Petition: Political or Legal Freedom?, 8 U.C.L,A. L. REV.
729, 732 n.10 (1961). The technique of political pressure (of which peti-
tion is a form) is offensive to the dignity of the court. Harper, Lobbyists
before the Court, 101 U. PENN. L. REV. 1172, 1173 (1953).
The pertinent right would rather appear to be the right to intervene.
However, the right of even interested parties to intervene in agency ad-
judication is not of constitutional stature. See Oberst, Parties to Admin-
istrative Proceedings, 40 MIcH. L. REV. 378 (1942). Cases discuss the right
of intervention from the standpoint of statutory interpretation rather than
constitutional due process. See, e.g., F.C.C. v. KOA, 319 U.S. 239 (1943);
F.C.C. v. Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Bamberger v. Clark, 390 F.2d
485 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Clarksburg Pub. Co. v. F.C.C., 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir.
1955). Anyway, Trucking Unlimited affects only the right of groups to
intervene, not that o'f individuals. Cf. 57 CAL. L. REV. 518, 541 (1969).
14. United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963);
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962);
Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1948); American Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
pose" doctrine applies even where the conduct is protected by first
amendment guarantees:
[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom
of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evi-
denced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken,
written or printed. . . . Such an expansive interpretation
of the constitutional guarantees of speech and press would
make it practically impossible to enforce laws against
agreements in restraint of trade .... 15
Thus, even though solicitation of legislation is protected by the
right to petition, a conspiracy in restraint of trade should not be
immune from the Sherman Act merely because its anticompetitive
purpose is to be effected by a first amendment activity.
The Noerr decision in effect created a special exception to the
"illegal purpose" doctrine where the illegal purpose is furthered
by attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws.16
Such political activity was held to be immune regardless of anti-
competitive intent. This special exception was an outgrowth of
the "representative government" argument.' 7 The representative
branches of the government largely depend upon information sup-
plied by the people. Necessarily, those who make their wishes
known to legislators will be personally interested in the outcome
of legislation, and may hope by presenting their views to influ-
ence the passage of laws beneficial to themselves or harmful to
competitors. Much of the information upon which lawmakers
must act is supplied by persons with such motives.'8 Therefore,
to subject solicitation of legislation to antitrust law whenever anti-
competitive intent is shown would seriously impair the flow of
needed information from the people to their representatives. Thus
in this instance the "illegal purpose" doctrine was overshadowed
by the need to protect the access of the representative branches
to information supplied by the governed.
II. BETWEEN NOERR AND TRUCKING UNLIMITED
The only Supreme Court decision in the line of cases leading
from Noerr to California was United Mine Workers of America v.
Pennington.19 In that case, several large unionized coal companies
254 U.S. 443 (1921); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th
Cir. 1952); Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1938); Slick
Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199 (N.J. 1951).
See 57 CAL. L. REv. 518 (1969).
15. Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1948); cf.
Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
16. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co., 432 F.2d
755, 757 (9th Cir. 1970).
17. See text accompanying footnote 12 supra.
18. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961).
19. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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together with the U.M.W. approached the Secretary of Labor and
influenced him to set a very high minimum wage for employees
of contractors selling coal to the TVA, with the intent of driving
the small non-union coal companies out of business. The defend-
ants also influenced the TVA to curtail spot market purchases of
coal, which were mostly exempt from the minimum wage law.
The Court held that these activities were not subject to antitrust
liability because they came within the Noerr exemption from the
Sherman Act. The exemption in Noerr pertained to attempts to
influence the "representative" branches-the legislature and the
executive. Since the Secretary of Labor and the TVA are part
of the executive and legislative branches, respectively, the actual
disposition of Pennington by the Supreme Court did not enlarge
the scope of the Noerr immunity. However, language in the
Pennington opinion raised the question of whether the Court sup-
posed the Noerr exemption to apply to attempts to influence any
government official, whether or not he was a member of the ex-
ecutive or legislative branches: "Noerr shields from the Sherman
Act a concerted effort to influence public officials . "... 20 Con-
sidering that judges are government officials, this language in
Pennington might be construed as impliedly including attempts to
influence the judiciary as being within the scope of Noerr.
The post-Pennington cases and commentators whittled away
at the exemption which Noerr and Pennington had set up. Later
cases established that the Noerr-Pennington immunity did not ex-
tend to situations where the attempt to influence government
officials was carried out by threat,21 or by supplying deliberately
false information to a regulatory agency,22 or where the govern-
ment official "influenced" was in fact a party to the conspiracy
in restraint of trade.22
A. Interference with Administrative Application of Previously
Made Rules Not Protected by Noerr Immunity.
In George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders,
20. 381 U.S. at 670; see 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1133, 1143
(1971); 81 HARV. L. REv. 847 (1968).
21. Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v Chauffeurs, 440 F2d 1096
(9th Cir. 1971).
22. Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971); see text accompanying footnotes
39-43 infra.
23. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690 (1962); Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 339 F.2d 564 (9th
Cir. 1964); 81 HARV. L. REV. 847, 854-56 (1968).
Inc.,2 4 decided by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in 1970, the
defendant had attempted to influence a government official who
set the specifications for swimming pool gutters in public pools to
set specifications that would effectively eliminate the equipment
of competitors from consideration. The defendant invoked the
Noerr-Pennington exemption, which it contended protected at-
tempts to influence any government official. The court held in-
stead that the exemption applied only to attempts to influence
government policy-makers, and did not insulate attempts to influ-
ence minor functionaries who did not make policies, but only car-
ried them out.
[T]he efforts of an industry leader to impose his product
specifications . . . on a harried architect hired by a local
school board hardly rise to the dignity of an effort to in-
fluence the passage or enforcement of laws. By "enforce-
ment of laws" we understand some significant policy de-
termination in the application of a statute, not a technical
decision about the best kind of weld to use in a swimming
pool gutter.
Noerr stressed the importance of free access to public
officials vested with significant policy-making discretion.
We doubt whether the court, without expressing additional
rationale, would have extended the Noerr umbrella to pub-
lic officials engaged in purely commercial dealings when
the case turned on other issues.
25
In Woods Exploration & Producing Co., v. Aluminum Co. of
America26 and Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc.27 the distinction for
Noerr immunity purposes between attempts to influence policy-
making and attempts to influence decisions which merely imple-
ment policy was reiterated. The Woods Exploration case involved
an attempt to influence a regulatory administrative agency which
had a formula for allocating allowable production of natural gas
from a certain gas field. The defendant "influenced" the agency's
allocations by supplying it with false information. The court re-
marked that while the process of initially arriving at a formula for
allocations was "political" in the Noerr sense, the subsequent im-
24. 424 F.2d 25 (Ist Cir. 1970).
25. Id. at 33; cf. 81 HARV. L. REV. 847 (1968), which argued that the
criterion for deciding when to apply the Noerr-Pennington immunity was
whether the government decision sought to be influenced was made for
political considerations or purely economic ones. For example, in Pen-
nington, the decision of the Secretary of Labor to raise the minimum wage
for coal miners was a policy decision made with political considerations,
and therefore Noerr would immunize the attempt to influence this deci-
sion; on the other hand, the decision by TVA officials to curtail spot pur-
chases of coal was not political, because the TVA is required by statute to
award contracts on purely economic criteria, 16 U.S.C. § 831(h) (b) (1964),
so the attempt to influence this decision would not be exempt from the
antitrust laws. 81 HARV. L. REV. at 853.
26. 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
27. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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plementation of the formula was not.28 Presumably, therefore, if
the defendants had attempted to influence the original policy-
making by submitting their views at the rule-making proceedings
in which the formula was adopted, they would have been protected
by Noerr. Thus, once an agency has promulgated a policy by
rule-making, any subsequent attempt to influence the application
of that rule would not be protected by Noerr immunity. 29
B. Attempts to Influence Adjudication not Protected by Noerr
Immunity
Both Woods and Hecht,30 which held that the Noerr exemption
did not apply to attempts to influence the implementation of policy,
remarked that the attempt to influence agency adjudication in
Trucking Unlimited was an instance of an attempt to influence
the mere implementation of pre-existing policy. Instead of lobby-
ing the Public Utilities Commission to change its liberal policy
toward granting licenses, the Trucking Unlimited defendants at-
tempted to thwart that policy by opposing license applicants at
agency adjudications.31 Indeed, adjudication under a rule or stat-
ute is by nature policy-implementation, not policy-making. There-
fore, if policy-implementation is not protected by the Noerr im-
munity, attempts to influence adjudication under a rule or statute
would necessarily be unaffected by Noerr.
The opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Trucking
Unlimited v. California Motor Transport32 (from which this appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court) stated that not only were at-
tempts to influence adjudication under a rule or statute outside
the scope of Noerr, but that attempts to influence any adjudica-
tion, in courts or administrative agencies, were not covered by the
Noerr immunity. The court reasoned that the basic consideration
which had led the Supreme Court in Noerr to grant an exemption
from the antitrust laws was not present in Trucking Unlimited.
Noerr had exempted attempts to influence the passage or enforce-
ment of laws, which would otherwise have been in violation of the
Sherman Act, in the interest of protecting the flow of information
28. 438 F.2d at 1297 (5th Cir. 1971).
29. Id.
30. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See text accompanying note 27
supra.
31. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
438 F.2d 1286, 1297 (5th Cir. 1971); 57 CAL. L. REV. 518, 522 (1969).
32. 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970).
between the people and their representatives in government.
3
But this "representative government" justification does not apply
when the attempt to influence government officials is directed at
the judiciary, which, unlike the executive and the legislature, is
not a "representative" branch.
The overwhelming public interest in uninhibited com-
munication between the people and their legislators and
law enforcement officials that justifies immunizing joint
efforts to influence those authorities from antitrust lia-
bility despite either wrongful purpose or the use of dis-
tortion and deception, does not apply to presentations to
judges and administrative officials in the course of adjudi-
cative proceedings. Unlike legislators and law enforce-
ment officials, judicial and administrative adjudicators do
not act in a representative capacity. There is a marked
difference between the processes by which they arrive at
decisions, the materials upon which they may properly
rely, and the atmosphere consistent with effective per-
formance of their respective functions.
3 4
Therefore the court of appeals in Trucking Unlimited excluded
from the operation of Noerr any attempt to influence adjudication,
whether in the courts or in administrative agencies.
III. THE EFFECT OF TRUCKING UNLIMITED;
EXPANSION OF THE SHAM EXCEPTION
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals in Trucking Unlimited, the reasoning behind the
disposition was altered considerably. The Supreme Court said that
the Noerr exemption covered the activities of the defendants, thus
refusing to distinguish between attempts to influence the passage
or enforcement of laws and attempts to influence adjudication.1
5
The Supreme Court thereby stood in direct opposition to the trend
in post-Noerr-Pennington cases toward limitation of the scope of
the antitrust immunity to attempts to influence policy decisions
in nonadjudicative proceedings. However, the Court held that the
33. See text accompanying notes 12, 16, 17, 18 supra.
34. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co., 432 F.2d
755, 759 n.6 (9th Cir. 1970). On the other hand, in the case of agency ad-
judication under a standard of public convenience and necessity, information
provided by intervening third parties may often be useful. This is demon-
strated by the fact that in Trucking Unlimited the P.U.C. and I.C.C. on
many occasions changed their determination as a result of the defendants'
interventions. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 67
Trade Cas. 72,298 at 84,744. It has been put, therefore, that the interest
in preserving access of interested third persons to adjudication of the public
convenience and necessity supports an extension of Noerr immunity to at-
tempts to influence such adjudication by intervention. Id.; 12 B.C. IND.
& COM. L. Rzv. 1133, 1143; 42 NOTRE DAME LAwYER 71, 83 (1966).
35. 92 S. Ct. at 912. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart
seems to assume that the majority opinion had distinguished between at-
tempts to influence administrative and judicial action as opposed to legis-
lative or executive action.
Notes
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
defendants in the instant case forfeited their Noerr immunity be-
cause their conduct fell under the "sham" exception.
A. The "Sham" Exception
The Court in Noerr remarked that the exemption from prose-
cution of attempts to influence legislation would not apply where
there was no genuine intent to influence the government, but
where the intent was rather to harm competitors directly, instead of
through procuring government action.
There may be situations in which a publicity campaign,
ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental ac-
tion, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing
more than an attempt to interfere directly with the busi-
ness relationships of a competitor and the application of
the Sherman Act would be justified. 36
The Court said in Trucking Unlimited that the defendants' scheme
fell under this "sham" exception.3 7 The Trucking Unlimited de-
fendants did not intend to prevent competitors from obtaining
licenses by defeating their applications on the merits. Every ap-
plication was opposed, regardless of the merits of the cases.3 8 The
object was to deter application; any success in the litigation itself
was serendipity. The ostensible attempt to influence adjudicatory
tribunals was therefore really only a form of direct interference.
Therefore, although Trucking Unlimited held that conspiracies in
restraint of trade which attempt to influence the courts or agency
adjudication are protected from prosecution by the Noerr exemp-
tion, the defendants in this case were not immune because they
were not genuinely trying to influence those tribunals and so were
within the "sham" exception to Noerr.
B. Abuse of the Adjudicative Process
The Trucking Unlimited opinion suggested a second reason for
taking the case out of the Noerr exemption. If illegal or unethical
methods are used to influence adjudication, there can be no im-
munity from the antitrust laws.3 9 Although the Court said in
36. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
37. 92 S. Ct. at 612.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery &
Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (fraudulent misrepresentation to the
Patent Office); Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chauffeurs, 440 F.2d
1096 (9th Cir. 1971) (coercion); Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) (fraudulent mis-
Noerr that the defendants' use of an unethical and fraudulent ad-
vertising technique to influence the state legislature did not for-
feit their exemption from the Sherman Act, because the Sherman
Act was not intended to police political ethics,40 their reasoning
does not apply where the attempt is to influence adjudication
rather than legislation. Adjudication is not a political process,
and should not be permitted to suffer the indignities tolerated in
the political arena, as the Court admonished in Trucking Unlim-
ited.
Misrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are
not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process ...
One claim, which a court or agency may think baseless,
may go unnoticed; but a pattern of baseless, repetitive
claims may emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude
that the administrative and judicial processes have been
abused. . . . Insofar as the administrative or judicial
processes are involved, actions of that kind cannot ac-
quire immunity by seeking refuge under the umbrella of
"political expression."'4 1
Furthermore, regulating agencies are often dependent upon infor-
mation supplied by the regulated industry, and rely upon the
truthfulness of such information to a much greater degree than
legislators rely upon the truthfulness of lobbyists. 42 Therefore,
the consequence of lying to an adjudicating regulatory agency or
to a court is loss of the Noerr exemption, 43 even though similar
tactics when used to influence the legislative or executive branches
do not affect antitrust immunity.
It is unclear, however, what conduct of the defendants the
Trucking Unlimited opinion referred to by the word "misrepre-
sentations." There was no allegation that the Trucking Unlim-
ited defendants misrepresented facts to the agencies or courts.
Apparently the Court had in mind merely that the defendants had
intervened in hearings and taken appeals in bad faith, regardless
representation to a regulating agency); Costilio, Antitrust's Newest
Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MICH. L. REV. 333 (1967).
40. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution in legislating
with respect to problems relating to the conduct of political activi-
ties, a caution which has been neglected in the decisions of this
court interpreting such legislation. All this would go for naught if
we permitted an extension of the Sherman Act to regulate activities
of that nature simply because these activities have a commercial
impact and involve conduct that can be termed unethical.
Id. at 141.
41. 92 S. Ct. at 613.
42. See Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971); 12 B.C. InD. & COM. L. REV. 1133,
1143 (1971); Costilio, Antitrust Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington
Defense, 66 MICH. L. REv. 333, 349 (1967).
43. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 92 S. Ct.
609 (1972); Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
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of the merits; when a party argues a cause which he knows has no
merit, he is in a sense misrepresenting to the tribunal that there
is a bona fide dispute of fact or law. Such conduct would be the
antitrust equivalent of abuse of process, except the consequen-
tial loss of antitrust immunity occurs only after "a pattern of
baseless claims emerge" rather than from an isolated instance.
44
Thus in Trucking Unlimited the concept of "abuse of the adjudica-
tive process" as resulting in forfeit of Noerr immunity, which in
previous cases had been applied only where there was positive
misrepresentation or coercion, 41 was extended to cover large-scale
institution of baseless claims, not involving any positive fraud or
conduct illegal per se.
46
C. Expansion of the "Sham" Exception
In the wake of Trucking Unlimited it seems that joint attempts
to influence any government official for anticompetitive purposes
are exempt from the Sherman Act, except where the influence is
sought through falsification of facts to a regulatory agency or
court, or where the attempt is only a "sham," hiding an intent to
cause direct injury. As for the limitation of Noerr immunity to
attempts to influence policy-formulation, as opposed to policy-
implementation, Trucking Unlimited casts doubt upon the viability
of this restriction since the licensing hearings at which the de-
fendants intervened involved merely specific application of pre-
viously-formulated policy.
47
In compensation, however, for this broad expansion of the
Noerr immunity to cover non-political activity (intervention at
44. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 92 S. Ct.
609, 613 (1972).
45. Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chauffeurs, 440 F.2d 1096
(9th Cir. 1971); Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co.
of America. 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971). Cf. Walker Process Equipment,
Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). See also
Costilio, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense,
66 MICH. L. REV. 333 (1967).
46. The practical importance of this extension of the "abuse of ad-
judicative process" exceotion to Noerr immunity is reduced, however, by
the consideration that whenever it is shown that the defendant had know-
ingly brought baseless claims on a wide scale, antitrust immunity would
anyway almost certainly be stripped away by the "sham" exception to
Noerr. The "baseless claim" rule is redundant as to the "sham" exception
because the essence of "sham" conduct is lack of real intent to influence
the government; where claims known to be worthless are pressed, obvi-
ously intent to influence the court or agency is absent. See text accom-
panying note 36 supra.
47. See text accompanying footnote 31 supra.
agency adjudication), Trucking Unlimited increased the effective-
ness of the "sham" exception. As it appeared in Noerr, the "sham"
exception was of limited applicability. The Court said in that case
that although the plaintiffs had suffered direct injury (loss of
good will) through the publicity campaign conducted by the de-
fendants, the defendants' conduct did not fall under the "sham"
exception-even if the defendants intended such direct injury to
occur-unless the plaintiffs could also prove that the defendants
had no genuine intent to influence the legislature.43 But in Truck-
ing Unlimited the Court held that the defendants' interventions
were a "sham" because direct injury was intended, even though it
was not alleged that the defendants did not also hope to influence
the agency decisions. 49 Thus the Trucking Unlimited opinion elim-
inated the necessity of proving the absence of any expectation of
influencing the government, a requirement which otherwise would
be a great obstacle. It is apparently sufficient, therefore, in order
to show a "sham," to prove that the primary intent of the attempt
to influence government action is to cause direct injury, even
though the conspirators may also really have had some hope of
influencing the government.
IV. CONCLUSION
Trucking Unlimited purports to be an application of the rea-
soning of Noerr, but Noerr does not support the conclusions
reached in Trucking Unlimited. Noerr created an exception to the
doctrine that conduct innocent of itself is rendered violative of the
Sherman Act by an anticompetitive intent, in the case where an
anticompetitive purpose is to be achieved by influencing the repre-
sentative branches of government. The exception was justified by
the need to preserve unimpaired the flow of information between
the people and their representatives in government. Since adjudi-
cation is not a representative process, however, this consideration
did not exist in Trucking Unlimited. Therefore, the "illegal pur-
pose" doctrine, it would be expected, should have governed the
decision in Trucking Unlimited-the alleged anticompetitive pur-
pose of the defendants rendering their otherwise legal intervention
violative of the antitrust laws.50
48. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961). Proving absence of any intent to influence
government action would be difficult. 57 CAL. L. REV. 518, 528 n.17 (1969).
49. The defendants' interventions in Trucking Unlimited were often
successful, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1133, 1143 (1971), so it is likely
that they had hoped to win at least some of the time.
50. It is well established that utilizing litigation in a joint effort to
restrain trade can be a violation of the Sherman Act. Walker Process
Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965);
United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); Kobe, Inc.
v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952); Lynch v. Magnavox
Co., 94 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1938).
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Nevertheless, although the Noerr rationale does not support
it, the Trucking Unlimited decision is not entirely unfelicitous.
Agency adjudication is not a "representative" process, but where
such adjudication is conducted under a standard of public con-
venience and necessity, protecting the access of the adjudicators
to such relevant information as may be provided by interested
third parties is in the public interest. Regulatory schemes are
often dependent upon information supplied by the regulated in-
dustry, and it may be well to insulate the symbiosis existing be-
tween agency and industry from the operation of the antitrust
laws.51 On the other hand, there is no such reason for immuniz-
ing intervention in, or instigation of, ordinary litigation in the
courts between private parties. Therefore, it is submitted that
future cases should not attribute to Trucking Unlimited the broad
interpretation of which its language is susceptible, but should con-
fine its effect to an extension of Noerr immunity only to attempts
to influence agency adjudication, and not to attempts to influence
ordinary litigation in the courts.
WILLIAM H. BELL
51. See 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1133, 1143 (1971).
